OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) methods will be used in this article, as well as several sources from the global OSINT community, think tanks, and the work of the author himself, to try to answer, at the end of the article, whether, when, and under what conditions the Russian supply of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles to the Ukrainian battlefield might be weakened.
The text focuses solely on the losses of Russian Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) and Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs), which, although only a narrow segment of the whole issue, can be used as a reliable benchmark. We will then look at the production and replenishment of equipment from depots, either directly to units, or to repair plants.
There are several OSINT communities that produce lists of destroyed equipment on the Internet. The equipment is added to the lists based on visual evidence (photos and videos), from which condition is determined (destroyed/damaged/abandoned/captured - or a combination thereof), the type of vehicle, and, on top, the geolocation is often added to the loss. Vehicle databases are continuously updated with new losses, older losses further documented and mistakes corrected. Currently the following two can be recommended:
Oryx [1], which is often cited by various thinthanks and journalists. And Warspotting [2], which is less well-known, without a list of Ukrainian losses, but with different rules to the sources used; the lists do not use, for example, footage of attacks filmed from ATGM (Antitank Guided Missile) displays or optics.
In this article only data published on Oryx database was used, and only vehicles labeled as destroyed were used for comparison. Condition of damaged, abandoned or captured was neglected, as the equipment that is only damaged or abandoned could, once the frontlines change, fall again to the hands of Russian Federation troops and could then be repaired or reused.
Tanks
First analyzed category is tanks. Vehicles with high durability, great terrain clearance and firepower.
The following numbers were recorded as destroyed in the following months:
September 2023- 56 units, October 2023- 93 units, November 2023- 78 units, December 2023- 74 units and January 2024- 52 units. In total, 353 tanks destroyed in 5 months.
At the moment, production of tanks is only provided by UVZ (URALVAGONZAVOD - УралВагонЗавод) in Nizhny Tagil. The only mass-produced model is the T-90M. It is being built both by upgrading older T-90s and by new production completely. There was a relatively long discussion about the production speed. On August 31, 2023, the French Institut Action Resilience released a study [3] estimating the production capacity of new tanks at UVZ at 50 units per year. Some other sources speak of up to 200 new tanks per year. However, according to available information, a total of 140 T-90M tanks have been produced as of 31 December 2022 [4], without distinguishing whether these are new production or in-depth upgrades of the original T-90s.
Production rate of T-90M tanks is clarified by a video from UVZ dated 25 September 2023, in which the assembly of the turret and hull with the number 192 was shown. Interestingly, the turret with number 192 was seen at UVZ as early as December 2022.
Turret No.192 T-90M at UVZ, December 2022
Assembly of turret No.192 with hull 192 at UVZ, September 2023
If the numbers of deliveries in 2021 and 2022 [4] are taken as a relevant source, the production for the 9 months of 2023 comes out to less than 52 units, which is less than 6 units per month. In the followed 5 months, 16 T-90M tanks were destroyed. In addition, another 16 vehicles are recorded as being damaged or abandoned for the same period.
Furthermore, in the past year, information has emerged about the restart of T-80 production at OmskTransMash (Омский завод транспортного машиностроения), and later first publicly discussed on 10 August 2023 by UVZ CEO Aleksandr Potapov [7]. Interestingly, the report was followed by video from Kaluga, from the local KADVI (Калужский турбинный завод) [8], in which they boasted of the first casting of the gearbox for the GTD-1250 gas turbine, the engine of the T-80 tanks. Further on in the video the production of other parts is shown. However, very few modern CNC machines were used in, both the casting process, and the machining of the castings. We can only speculate whether this is due to "prototyping" or whether it is due to the obsolescence of the technical plan. Interestingly, the information about the restarting of production was also brought by the Russian expert online publication Topwar [9] on 15 December 2023. As it rightly states, these engines are needed both for the restart of T-80 production, and for the modernisation and revival of approximately 900 T-80 tanks, which, according to satellite images, were stored in storage bases in 2023. In addition, the turbines will be used as a spare parts for T-80 series tanks already in the tank formations of the Russian Federation. The question remains on what turret will be chosen for the tanks. Turrets have not been cast in Russia since the mid-1990s, which is why it will most likely be the Burlak turret [10], which was developed at the Omsk plant and tested on the T-80 chassis.
Prototype Burlak turret on T-80 chassis during testing
Another option of the replenishment of losses is refurbishment and modernisation of tanks in long-term storage. List of plants, where tank upgrades are taking place, was again compiled by the Action Resilience Institut [1].
So far, 5 locations are confirmed to us to be upgrading and recovering tanks. These are the already known UVZ plants in Nizhny Tagil, where T-72B and T-72B3 series tanks are being upgraded to new T-72B Obr. 2022 and T-72B3 Obr. 2022 standard. In the followed months, 34 T-72B Obr. 2022 and 6 T-72B3 Obr. 2022 tanks were destroyed.
The problem is that the modernisation of T-72 series vehicles is further carried out by the 61st Armoured Repair Plant (61. Бронетанковый ремонтный завод) and the 163rd Armoured Repair Plant (163. Бронетанковый ремонтный завод). According to various sources, the number of modernised equipment per year is approximately between numbers 230 and 330. Outside the UVZ, no information on vehicle deliveries is known to us. The only publicly available information is footage from TV station Zvezda from 6 October 2023 [12]. Footage shows, apart from the long-term stored equipment, equipment damaged in the fighting in Ukraine. V and Z markings are clearly visible on the vehicles. Noteworthy are also the lined up BTR-50 armoured personnel carriers, which are likely undergoing refurbishment.
Vehicles lined up for repairs and modernisation at 61st Armoured Repair Plant.
Vehicles with Z and V invasion markings are clearly visible.
Another line of T-72 tanks, including one T-72B3 with invasion markings. Note BTR-50s on the right.
Another plant carrying out modernisations is OmskTransMash, where the T-80BV series vehicles are being upgraded to the T-80BV Obr. 2022 and T-80BVM Obr. 2022 standard, or now to the 2023 modernisation. According to the Institut Action Resilience [1], the modernisation capacity in Omsk is around 30 units per year, but there are even higher estimates of 180 to 200 T-80BV/BVM vehicles per year [15]. In the last 5 months, two T-80BV Obr. 2022 and two T-80BVM Obr. 2022 have been counted as destroyed.
Screenshot from production hall inside Omsk plant shows work on T-80BV Obr. 2022 turrets, 9 February 2023
The last plant where tank modernization is taking place is the 103rd Armoured Repair Plant (103. Бронетанковый ремонтный завод), which modernises, repairs and refurbishes following tanks: T-54/55, T-62M/MV, various variants of T-72 and T-80. According to the institut Action Resilience, it should have an annual production capacity of 30 to 60 tanks. Interestingly, the plant received an order in October 2022 to upgrade 800 T-62M/MV tanks to T-62M Obr. 2022 and T-62MV Obr. 2022 variants. The plant is to complete the entire order within four years, i.e. 200 units per year. Only 2 destroyed T-62M Obr. 2022 and one T-62MV Obr. 2022 were recorded as lost in the 5 months focused on.
T-62M Obr.2022 (left) and T-62MV Obr.2022 (right) belonging to 5th Separate Guards Tank Brigade under 36th Combined Arms Army, Donetsk Oblast, 31 January 2024
The last addition is the delivery of vehicles directly from the storage bases to the manoeuvre elements in Ukraine. That’s how were the first T-62M/MVs were delivered to the troops in the summer of 2022. Then, during 2023, deliveries of T-80B, T-72A and, last but not least, various variants of the T-54/55 series tanks. The last such witnessed tranport has been of T-64 tanks. Until now, these vehicles have been used only by units formed from the armed formations of the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics. However, the origin of these T-64s can be traced to the Russian Federation [42].
According to Covert Cabal's analysis of satellite imagery [18], there were approximately 4,696 intact tanks at storage bases in September 2022. Analysis of the imagery approximately a year later showed only 3,911 intact tanks. This puts a rough estimate of the capacity of the repair facilities somewhere between 400-600 vehicles per year. The plants also devote part of their capacity to repairing vehicles withdrawn from the frontlines. Portion of the vehicles withdrawn from the bases goes directly to the units where they replace the losses.
Still shows transportation of T-64 tanks from storage bases to western Russia. Video is dated 9 December 2023.
Though, judging by the vegetation, the video was filmed earlier, likely at the turn of Ocotber/November 2023.
At the moment, according to available sources, approximately 80 new T-90M tanks are being produced and around 400 to 600 tanks are being upgraded per year. Thus, the current production can only partially replace the tanks destroyed on the Ukrainian battlefield. Most of the losses are covered only thanks to supply of tanks from the storage, mainly by replacing them with all tank models.
Therefore, the number of vehicles in condition to be delivered from bases directly to units is expected to decrease. Thus, over time, the strength of the Russian tank force will be reduced. This analysis, however, takes into account only Russian production compared to destroyed tanks. Over the period followed period, an additional 163 tanks have been recorded as damaged or abandoned.
Infantry Fighting Vehicles
The second analyzed category is Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFV = Infantry fighting vehicle). This category is, again, a very broad group of vehicles, ranging from the old BMP-1 tracked vehicles, and their BMP-1AM upgrade, the BMP-2 and its subvariants, to the BMP-3. Then there are the wheeled BTR-82A and the BMD-2 and BMD-4M for airborne troops. The recorded losses of these vehicles as destroyed are as follows:
September 2023- 91 units, October 2023- 160 units, November 2023- 83 units, December 2023- 132 units and in January 2024- 110 units. Thus, a total of 576 IFVs destroyed in 5 months. A further 173 vehicles of IFV category are recorded as damaged or abandoned in the 5 followed months.
The production of combat vehicles for both ground and airborne forces takes place at the KurganMashZavod (Курганмашзавод) factory. At the moment, BMP-3 vehicles are being produced, but there is also talk of production of the BMD-4M [21]. However, in two whole years, just one photo of the BMD-4M appeared, in November 2022 [28]. According to the Russian information website GhurKhan, which focuses on armoured vehicles, there was no production of BMD-4M vehicles at least in 2022, but only their overhaul [22].
According to information from multiple sources, the production of the BMP-3 model was between 150 and 300 units per year. Most analysts agreed on a maximum of 150 vehicles per year. There was an increase in production in 2023, which some sources put of up to approximately 400 units per year [20].
Production of BMP-3 at KurganMashZavod
For the year 2023, author spotted the following deliveries with the following numbers of vehicles:
On 4 February 2023 [23] there are 4 units visually confirmed in the photo. On 14 April 2023 [25] there is a half-minute video instead of one photo. The longest sequence shows at least 25 vehicles at a time. On 4 May 2023 [24], another 11 vehicles were filmed with tricolour camouflage pattern and 2 in plain green paint. On 11 July 2023 [26] further 15 vehicles are confirmed. 30 September 2023 [27] another 9 vehicles. 31 October 2023 [29], 12 vehicles in camouflage pattern and 4 in plain green are visually confirmed. 14 December 2023 [30] was the last delivery of the year, with at least 14 vehicles.
So in total, at least 93 vehicles have been visually confirmed, however, the total number of vehicles present is not shown in the videos. If assumed, all footage was collected of all deliveries and the deliveries of battalion elements (30 vehicles) are always counted, the annual production arrives at 210 units. If the information [20] that KurganMashZavod increased production in 2023 to deliver a battalion element every month is taken into account, and the recordings of transports in the second half of 2023 support this, the production is somewhere between 360-400 vehicles per year.
Another vehicle that is believed to be under production is the BTR-82AT, however no visual confirmation of deliveries is known to the author. If deliveries were to be based on those of the BTR-82A/AM vehicles before the war [32], the author estimates production of BTR-82AT at 300 pieces at most, as the production of BTR-82A was between 130-150 vehicles and approximately 330 BTR-80 vehicles were upgraded to the BTR-82AM standard.
Pair of BTR-82AT used by Russian forces in Ukraine, summer 2023
The problems with the survivability of BTR-82A/AM/AT series of vehicles and long-standing issues with the development of the VPK-7829 Bumerang, lead to the design of a successor of the BTR-82 series, whose development has been underway for some time already. The successor is intended to be cheaper than the VPK-7829 and should eliminate some of the shortcomings of BTR-82 series, such as protection or carried infantry having to dismount through side doors, etc. Throughout the year 2023, several photographs of the BTR-22 vehicle appeared [34] and this year appeared photos of testing of the vehicle. For now there is no information about the production of this vehicles. But since this will likely be the first, conceptually new vehicle accepted into service, relatively large promotional campaign is to be expected.
BTR-22 at the end of January 2024, most likely during testing.
Another way how Russian IFV losses are being replaced, is by upgrading and reviving stored pieces, whether BMP-1 or BMP-2 vehicles. BMP-1 vehicles are upgraded to the BMP-1AM standard by adding the BPPU turret module, known already from the BTR-82A/AM/AT vehicles. And BMP-2 series vehicles to the BMP-2M variant. Once again, no numbers are available for the production of BMP-1AM vehicles. At least 9 BMP-1AM vehicles are known to have been delivered in early 2024 [39]. No delivery is known to have been filmed in 2023, though this does not rule out the possibility that some took place.
Photo from delivery of BMP-1AM vehicles in January 2024
In case of BMP-2M vehicles, it is known at least 2 vehicle deliveries took place last year, on 7 September 2023 [36] and then in December 2023 [37]. Modernisation of BMP-2 IFVs from storage is known to be taking place as well.
For all these vehicles, production capacity of at least several hundred pieces per year could be expected. Constraints for upgrades and refurbishment are caused by the condition of the stored vehicles, some of which are de facto just empty hulls.
Thanks to the work of several Twitter accounts, state of the storage bases of the Russian Federation [39] is known to us. Before the beginning of the full-scale invasion, 4,811 BMP-1/2 series vehicles were stored at the bases, of which 1,081 vehicles were removed. Some of them were repaired and some were even modernized, while some of the vehicles were sent directly to the units. Thus, 3 730 vehicles remained in storage bases. Even according to satellite images, 765 units can be identified as complete wrecks (fully stripped hulls). On the other hand, the numbers could be lower, as the numbers are from December 2023, while, unfortunately, the satellite images are from the whole year.
These satellite images show one of the storage facilities of 227th Storage base and removal of equipment throughout 2023
The inadequate vehicle replacement is also emphasized by the use of older APCs, such as the BTR-50, or the use of prototypes and vehicles for testing, such as the BTR-90 [41]. Russian production is, therefore, only able to replace IFV losses through direct delivery of hundreds of vehicles from storage bases and through their refurbishment and modernisation. Production covers roughly half of the annual losses, which is why modernization and refurbishment must cover the approximately 600 remaining vehicles per year. This figure, however, refers only to equipment that is confirmed as destroyed and whose destruction is documented. A further 173 vehicles are documented as damaged and there are certainly some left yet to be discovered.
One of two existing BTR-90 prototypes in eastern Ukraine, October 2023
Conclusion
Based on the information mentioned above could be concluded that in category of IFVs and tanks, significant degradation of capabilities of Russian units in category of IFVs and tanks cannot be expected this (2024) and next (2025) year. Despite this, some degradation of capabilities will be evident, caused by the gradual replacement of more advanced devices (observation devices, sensors, etc.) by devices that are simpler in design, cheaper and without sanctionable components on the most advanced versions of vehicles. Conversely, the oldest variants of vehicles are being upgraded with capabilities they haven’t previously featured, such as thermal sights or fire control systems. While these features do not reach the quality of those fitted to, for example, the most modern tanks in Russian service, the T-90M or T-80BVM, they show some level of progress. Implementation of some of the lessons learned from combat deployment is also noticable, whether in terms of countermeasures against drones (jammers, slat armour, etc.) or changes in the mounting of reactive armour.
Weakening of capabilities can be expected at the turn of 2025/2026, when the resources in form of equipment ready to be deployed in short period of time, stored at storage bases inherited from the times of USSR, should be completely depleted. This weakening is, however, dependent on several factors: first of all, maintaining sanction policies, both on Western components and production facilities, and on Russian exports. And, second of all, steady pace of Russian losses, which is dependent on Ukraine's will to fight and resources available to Ukraine for fighting, i.e. the availability of weapons and, above all, of ammunition.
We should remind ourselves that, production of Russian Federation is just a mere shadow compared to that of Soviet Union and only fraction of what Russian propaganda claims. Yet it is considerably higher than in Europe, both in tanks and infantry fighting vehicles.
Jiří Jiroušek is a member Team4Ukraine, a member of Active Reserves of the Army of the Czech Republic.
List of abbreviations:
MBT - main battle tank
IFV - infantry fihting vehicle
ATGM - Anti tank guide missile
UA - Ukrajina
RF - Russian federation
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